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This paper analyses the functioning of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
To that end, we apply duration models to estimate an augmented target-zone model, 
explicitly  incorporating  political  and  institutional  factors  into  the  explanation  of 
European exchange rate policies. The estimations are based on quarterly data of eight 
currencies participating  in the ERM, covering the complete history of  the European 
Monetary  System.  Our  results  suggest  that  both  economic  and  political  factors  are 
important determinants of the ERM currency policies. Concerning economic factors, the 
money supply, the real exchange rate, the interest in Germany and the central parity 
deviation would have negatively affected the duration of a given central parity, while 
credibility  and  the  price  level  in  Germany  would  have  positively  influenced  such 
duration. Regarding political variables, elections, central bank independence and left-
wing administrations would have increased the probability of maintaining the current 
regime, while unstable governments would have been associated with more frequent 
regime changes. Moreover, we show how the political augmented model outperforms, 
both  in  terms  of  explanatory  power  and  goodness  of  fit,  the  model  which  just 
incorporates pure economic determinants. 
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1. Introduction 
   
The  European  Monetary  System  (EMS)  was  established  in  1979  as  tool  for 
exchange rate stabilization and for encouraging convergence of economic and monetary 
policies. The centrepiece of the EMS was the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), a 
system of pegged, but adjustable, exchange rate in which the central parity grid could be 
altered to take into account changing economic conditions and relative performance of 
the participant economies. Through a set of monitoring mechanisms (based in economic 
variables such as interest rates and inflation), the EMS authority tacked the convergence 
of the member economies and enforce a target zone on their exchange rates. If they 
decided  by  mutual  agreement  that  a  particular  parity  could  not  be  defended, 
realignments of the central rates were permitted.  
 
The ERM constituted an important intermediary step to Economic and Monetary 
Union  (EMU)  in  Europe,  the  most  ambitious  experiment  since  the  Bretton-Woods 
system. With the beginning of EMU in January 1999, the ERM ceased to have effect, 
being replaced by the new, modified exchange rate mechanism (the so-called ERM-II) 
designed  to  maintain  exchange-rate  stability  between  the  euro  and  the  national 
currencies of those European countries not participating in EMU. 
 
After  the  Krugman  (1991)’s  seminal  paper,  there  has  been  a  burgeoning 
literature on examining the exchange rate dynamics in a target zone, stressing rate that it 
depends both on exchange rate fundamentals and on its own expected rate of expected 
change.    On  the  other  hand,  another  important  line  of  research  (see  Mélitz,  1994; 
Bussière and Mulder, 1999) has demonstrated how the explicit incorporation of political 
and institutional factors into the analysis of currency crisis, improves considerably the 
explanatory power of just pure economic models. In spite of the suggestive evidence 
provided by these works, the application of the developments of the growing Political 
Economy literature has been largely restricted to the analysis of inflation, public debts 
or budget deficits (see Grilli et al., 1991; Roubini and Sachs, 1988) and, when applied to 
international macroeconomics, focused on the case of emerging economies.  
 
Consequently, the aim of this paper is to combine these two lines of research 
(the target zone models and the influence of political variables) by mixing into a unique  
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model  the  economic  factors  suggested  by  the  literature  with  some  political  and 
institutional factors, in an attempt to provide a deep understanding of the functioning of 
the ERM. To that end, we depart from the previous papers by using duration analysis to 
examine the survival of the central parities in the ERM. We have applied this approach 




Concerning the political and institutional factors, two questions explored in the 
Political Economy literature are of special interest for our investigation: 
-  Do politicians try to (artificially) stimulate the economy before elections? 
-  Are  there  systematic  differences  in  the  policies  implemented  by  parties  of 
different ideological orientation?  
 
The first question has been deeply explored by the Opportunistic models [see 
Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1976), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) or Persson 
and  Tabellini  (1990),  among  others],  which  analyse  the  incentives  of  politicians  to 
manipulate the economy in the period just before an election, typically by means of 
expansionary policies. The analysis of the second question is the focus of the so-called 
Partisan  models  [see  Hibbs  (1977)  and  Alesina  (1987)],  which  investigate  the 
relationship  between  the  macroeconomic  policies  implemented  and  the  ideological 
orientation of the government. Typically, right-wing parties care about inflation and 
attach lower weights to unemployment, while left-wing are more willing to bear the 
costs of inflation to fight unemployment. 
 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the study  of the so-called  ''Political 
Business  Cycles''  for  the  European  case  could  be  even  more  revealing  than  for  the 
American case, since in the US the election dates are fixed and pre-established. By 
contrast, in the majority of the European countries the election dates are chosen by the 
ruling party while it is still governing. Therefore, one would expect that the government 
would  select  the  election  date  in  such  a  way  that  it  coincides  with  a  favourable 
economic  situation  that  would  favour  the  government's  popularity.  Furthermore,  the 
                                                 
1 The closer work is the paper from Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) who investigated the impact 
of some political variables (left-wing governments, elections, change in government, past and future  
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European  case  is  also  interesting  since  the  process  toward  EMU  would  have  either 
changed the incentives or impose severe restrictions over preferences for the different 
political  parties  (for  example  socialist  parties  giving  more  weight  to  the  control  of 
inflation in their political agendas).  
 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  review  the  theoretical 
framework used to explain exchange-rate movements inside official fluctuation bands. 
Section 3 briefly describes the methodology of duration model approach. In Section 4 
we describe the data set used to capture the potential determinants of the survival of the 
central parities in the ERM, while Section 5 reports the empirical results. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are provided in Section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
In  this  paper  we  make  use  of  the  target  zone  models  to  identify  potential 
determinants of regime changes in the ERM. Indeed, Krugman (1991)’s seminal paper 
was  intentionally  a  highly  stylised  representation  of  the  ERM  whose  exchange  rate 
dynamics was sought to capture, providing some key insights into the way such regime 
might operate.   
 
The flex-price “monetary” model, that underlies much of the current literature on 
target zones, consists of the following three equations: 
 
*
t t t t q s p p = + -                (1) 
 
t t t t t m p y i f l e - = - -               (2) 
 
* ( / ) t t t t i i E ds dt - =               (3) 
 
where  t s  is the log of the exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency),  t q  is the 
log of the real exchange rate,  t p  is the log of the goods price level,  t m is the log of the 
money supply,  t y  is the log of the real output,  t i  is the nominal interest rate,  t e  is a 
                                                                                                                                               
government victory or defeat, new finance minister) on the exchange rate regimes of 20 OECD countries  
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stochastic  disturbance,  t E   is  the  expectation  operator  conditional  on  information 
available at time t and an asterisk denotes a foreign variable. Equation (1) defines the 
real  exchange  rate  (where 
*
t p is  assumed  to  be  exogenous),  equation  (2)  is  the 
equilibrium condition in the money market and equation (3) is the uncovered interest 
parity condition (where 
*
t i is assumed to be exogenous).  
 
These  three  equations  define  a  (non-  linear)  system  with  three  endogenous 
variables:  t s ,  t p  and  t i . Solving (1) for  t p  and (3) for  t i  and substituting in (2) gives 
 
* * ( / ) t t t t t t t t t s m y q i p E ds dt f l e l = - + + - - +        (4) 
 
and, defining  
 
* *




( / ) t t t t s f E ds dt l = +               (6) 
 
 
Equation (6) is the standard target zone model, inspired by Krugman (1991), where 
the  log  of  the  exchange  rate  depends  both  on  a  scalar  measure  of  exchange  rate 
fundamentals and on its own expected rate of expected change, with the parameter l 
indexing the importance of the latter effects. This equation is a stochastic first-order 
differential  equation.  By  ruling  out  speculative  bubbles,  the  forward  expectations 
solution can be derived (Bertola, 1994) where the saddle path exchange rate is equal to 










¥ - - = ∫             (7) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
between 1959 and 1993, by means of event-study methodology.  
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  In order to obtain a relationship between the contemporaneous exchange rate and 
the fundamentals: 
 
  ( ) t t s s f =                 (8) 
 
additional assumptions on the stochastic process of the fundamentals are needed. 
 
2. 1. The free-float case 
 
  In  the  absence  of  intervention,  t f   is  assumed  to  follow  a  Brownian  motion 
process with drift m and rate of variance 
2 s : 
 
  t t df dt dW m s = +               (9) 
 
where  t dw  is a standard Weiner process. Then, integrating (7) yields: 
 
  t t s f lm = +                 (10) 
 
  Therefore, in a free-float exchange rate regime characterized by no interventions, 
there would be a linear relationship between the contemporaneous exchange rate and the 
fundamentals. In the simplest case when the drift m is zero, such relationship could be 
represented as the 45 degree line (see Figure 1). Therefore, the freely floating exchange 
rate must not deviate excessively from the fundamentals when the latter takes arbitrary 
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Figure 1: The exchange rate-fundamental relationship  




















2.2. A target zone with perfectly credible bands 
 
  In  Krugman’s  (1991)  basic  target  zone  model,  it  is  assumed  that  monetary 
authorities intervene in order to keep the exchange rate within a specific band around a 
central parity: 
 
  t s s s £ £                 (11) 
 
where  s  and  s  are the lower and upper edges of the exchange rate bands. From (11), 
the fundamental indicator is restricted to a band that corresponds to the exchange rate 
band: 
 
  t f f f £ £                 (12) 
 
where  the  lower  and  upper  edges  of  the  fundamental  band  satisfy  ( ) s s f =   and 
( ) s s f = . 
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  In order to derive the exchange rate function (8) for the target zone case, and 
assuming  that  interventions  in  the  exchange  rate  market  are  marginal,  the  expected 
exchange rate depreciation term in (6) can be derived using Ito’s lemma. This results in 
a  second-order  differential  equation  for  the  exchange  rate  as  a  function  of  the 





t t f f
t t s f Ae A e




















= <          (14) 
 
1 A  and  2 A  are constants of integration to be determined by the boundary conditions 
satisfied by the exchange rate function  ( ) s f  at the edges of the fundamental band. 
 
  These boundary conditions are generally called “smooth pasting”, which require 
that the path of  t s  be tangent to the band, removing the possibility of one-way bets on 
the exchange rate at it approaches the boundaries. This smooth pasting property is one 
of the two main results of Krugman’s model and implies that the exchange rate should 
be a non-linear function of the underlying fundamentals. The second main result is that 
the exchange rate function  ( ) s f  looks life the S-curve in Figure 2 (again drawn for the 
simplest case when the drift m is zero). Note that the exchange rate lies below the 45 
degree line in the upper half of the figure and above it in the lower half. This is the so-
called “honeymoon” effect: in a perfectly credible target zone, the expectations of future 
interventions to stabilize the exchange rates drag it towards the middle of the band, 
making it more stable than the underlying fundamental. Algebraically, this “bias due to 
the band” is represented by the exponential term in (13). 
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Figure 2: The exchange rate-fundamental relationship  



















2.3. A target zone with credibility problems 
 
  Unlike Krugman’s model, exchange rate realignments in the ERM did occur 
fairly  frequently.  Bertola  and  Caballero  (1992)  present  a  simple  model  of  discrete 
exchange-rate intervention that allows for stochastic realignments. In addition to the 
fundamentals, the (log of the) central parity  t c , which is also a stochastic variable, is 








t t t f f c º -                 (16) 
 
so that 
' s  and 
' f  represents, respectively, the log deviation of the exchange rate and the 
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' ' [( )/ ] t t t t s f E ds dc dt l = + +             (17) 
 
Bertola and Caballero (1992) consider it possible for the official authorities to 
change  the  central  parity  only  when  the  exchange  rate  reaches  the  bands.  As  a 








in (17) is zero inside the band, and therefore the solution is: 
 
* *
1 2 * * t t f f
t t s f Ae Ae
k k lm = + + +           (18) 
 
where  1 k  and  2 k  depend again on the parameters l, m and s, and only one constant, A, 
is to be determined since we are assuming a symmetric band. 
 
  Using identities (15) and (16), equation (18) can also be expressed in terms of 
the fundamentals and the central parity: 
 
 
1 2 ( ) ( ) t t t t f c f c
t t s f Ae Ae
k k am
- - = + + -         (19) 
 
  When f reaches either of the boundaries, the authorities may either intervene to 
bring the exchange rate back to the initial central parity  ( ) t c  (i.e. defend the current 
parity) or declare a new fluctuation band  1 ( ) t t c c s s + = ± - and unchanged width (i.e. 
realign  the  central  parity).  Probabilities  ( ) 1 p -   and  p   are  assigned  respectively  to 
these two options. As a result, depending on the value of p, the relationship between the 
contemporaneous  exchange  rate  and  the  fundamental  [ ( )] t t s s f =   assumes  different 
shapes. When  1
2 0 p < < , the perfect credible target zone model is obtained, producing 
the S-shaped relationship. When  1
2 p = , the market evaluates as equally probable both 
an intervention and a realignment, the solution then coinciding with the free-floating 45  
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degree line. Finally, when 
1
2 p >  expectations of future changes in the exchange rate are 
triggered even before the exchange rate reaches the boundaries, the  ( ) s f  function being 
everywhere  steeper  than  it  could  be  under  free  float.  Therefore,  the  solution  locus 
becomes an inverted S, now the band for fundamentals being smaller than the exchange 
rate band (see Figure 3, drawn for the simplest case when the drift m is zero). 
 
Figure 3: The exchange rate-fundamental relationship  






















3.- Econometric methodology: Duration Analysis 
 
In this section, we offer a brief description of the main concepts and functions 
used in the duration analysis. This methodology is not new in economics. Various Labor 
Economics studies have applied this technique to investigate the factors that explain the 
observed exit/entry rates into the unemployment (a  good example is the work from 
Bover et al, 1997). Other applications include the field of Industrial Organization, for 
example  McCloughan  and  Stone  (1998),  who  examine  the  life  duration  of  some 
multinational subsidiaries in the UK. 
 
Duration analysis is particularly suitable for the analysis of data which have two 
main characteristics: (1) the dependent variable is the waiting time until the occurrence  
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of a well-defined event, and (2) there are some explanatory variables whose effect on 
this waiting time we wish to assess. In this paper we are going to relate these “well-
defined” events with the changes of regime occurred within the ERM. 
 
  In  the  characterization  of  T,  the  (non-negative)  random  variable  representing 
survival time
2, two functions play a central role: the survivor function, S(t), defined as 
the complement of the c.d.f.
3, represents the probability of “surviving” past time t. On 
the contrary, the hazard function, h(t), gives the (instantaneous) rate of occurrence of 
the event; that is, the probability that the phenomenon of interest is observed at time t. 








=           (20) 
In words, the rate of occurrence of the event at duration t equals the density of events at 
t, divided by the probability of surviving to that duration without having experienced 
the event. When the hazard is not constant we say that the process exhibits duration 
dependence.  Assuming  that  ( ) h ×   is  differentiable,  there  will  be  positive  (negative) 
duration  dependence  at  time  t  if  ( ) 0 dh t
dt
  >    
  ( ) 0 dh t
dt
    <        
.  With  positive 
(negative)  duration  dependence,  the  probability  of  observing  a  change  increases 
(decreases) as time passes. 
 
As a first approximation to study the spells between two consecutives changes, 
we can restrict our analysis to just the time elapsed without considering the effects of 
any other additional covariates; this is often cited as the non-parametric analysis and 
consists  in  the  estimation  of  the  empirical  (i.e.  unconditional)  hazard  and  survivor 
functions.  
 
As  equation  (20)  shows,  for  each  duration  t,  the  empirical  hazard  is  the 
proportion of cases that have survived up to t that change exactly in that moment. The 
                                                 
2 More precisely, T is assumed to be a non-negative continuous random variable with probability density 
function (p.d.f.) f(t) and cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F(t)=[Pr T≤ t] 
3 The exact definition of the survival function is:  { } ( ) Pr 1 ( ) ( )
t S t T t F t f x dx
¥
= > = - =∫   
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product-limit Kaplan-Meier (see Kaplan and Meier, 1958) method is usually employed 










where  t n   is  the  number  of  cases  that  changes  at  time  t  and  t d   is  the  surviving 
population up to that instant. 
 
With respect to the survivor function, the maximum-likelihood Kaplan-Meier 
estimator of the cumulative survivor function is defined according to: 
 













  Typically in economics, we will be more interested in estimating the effects of 
additional  regressors  on  the  expected  hazard  rates.  This  is  the  so-called  parametric 
analysis where the two predominant approaches developed for modelling the additional 
effects  are  the  Proportional  Hazard  (PH)  and  the  Accelerated  Failure-Time  (AFT) 
models. 
The first family of models, introduced by Cox (1972), provides an appealing 
setting  to  asses  the  influence  of  additional  regressors  on  the  hazard  function.  More 
precisely, the hazard at time t for an individual i with characteristics  i x  is assumed to 
be: 
 
{ } 0 ( | ) ( )exp i i i h t x h t x b ¢ =       (21) 
 
where  0( ) h t   is  the  baseline  hazard  function.  Note  how  this  specification  clearly 
separates  the  effect  of  time,  captured  by  the  baseline  function,  from  that  of  the 
covariates, which is reflected either as a proportional increase or decrease in the hazard. 
Different  PH  models  are  obtained  depending  on  the  assumption  made  about  the 
functional form of the baseline. For example, if our data exhibits a non-constant hazard  
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rate the Weibull distribution would be an appropriate choice; in this case, the baseline 
function is given by the following expression: 
 
1
0( ) h t t
q q
- =         (22) 
 
where the ancillary parameter, q , captures the duration dependence; note that when this 
parameter is greater than one, the hazard will increase with time (i.e. positive duration 
dependence) while if were lower then as time passed the hazard rate would decease 
indicating a negative dependence. 
 
  The  Exponential  distribution  is  a  particular  case  of  the  Weibull  when  the 
ancillary parameter equals one. This case assumes that the influence of time is constant 
over time as the baseline reduces to:  
 
0( ) 1 h t =  
Hence,  this  distribution  is  suitable  for  modeling  data  with  constant  hazard  (i.e.  no 
duration dependence). 
 
  An  alternative  method  consists  on  leaving  the  baseline  hazard  completely 
unspecified  and  estimating  the  parameters  using  a  partial  likelihood  function.  This 
approach was proposed by Cox (1972) and may be helpful for checking the robustness 
of the results obtained from that a Weibull or an Exponential model. 
 
The AFT approach proposes an alternative method to model the influence of 
additional variables on the waiting-time, namely running a simple regression where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the survival time. More precisely: 
 
log i i i T x b e ¢ = +  
where ei is an error term whose distribution have to be specified. As in the PH setting, 
different models are obtained by assuming different distributions for the error term. 
 
  A  large  fraction  of  papers  in  the  empirical  literature  on  target  zones  have 
attempted to shed light on the variables that determine the (observed) probability of  
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experiencing  a  regime  change.  Since  the  PH  models  focus  on  the  hazard  function, 
whose connection with the concept of probability is quite clear, they provide a suitable 
framework for relating economic and political factors with the regime changes observed 
alongside the ERM history. Thus, in the empirical section of the paper we will make use 




4.1. Dependent variable 
In our study we use quarterly data of eight currencies participating in the ERM 
of the EMS: the Belgian franc (BFR), the Danish crown (DKR), the Portuguese escudo 
(ESC),  the  French  franc  (FF),  the  Dutch  guilder  (HFL),  the  Irish  pound  (IRL),  the 
Italian  lira  (LIT)  and  the  Spanish  peseta  (PTA).  Given  the  role  of  Germany  as  the 
nominal  anchor  of  the  EMS  (see  Bajo-Rubio  et  al.,  2001),  our  exchange  rates  are 
expressed vis-á-vis the Deustchemark. The sample period runs from the first quarter of 
1979 to the fourth quarter of 1998, covering the complete history of the System. 
 
Table 1 shows the main realignments and changes of these currencies in the 
EMS during the 1979-1998 period. As can be seen, although the fluctuation band was 
originally set at  ± 2.25%, LIT, PTA and ESC used a wider band of fluctuation (± 6%). 
After almost a year of unprecedented turmoil in the history of the EMS, the fluctuation 
bands  of  the  ERM  were  broadened  in  August  1993  to  ± 15%  except  for  HFL  and 
Deutschemark, which remained with the narrow bands of  ± 2.25%. On 1 January 1999 
the EMS ceased to exist. On the one hand, as shown in Table 1, for our sample of 
currencies the ERM registered eighteen realignments, being twelve of them prior to the 
currency  turmoil  of  the  subperiod  1992-1993.    On  the  other  hand,  many  changes 
affected  more  than  one  currency,  such  as  multiple  realignments  or  modification  of 
fluctuations bands.   
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ERM starts to operate with the BFR, DKR, DM, FF, IRL, LIT and HFL. 
They are in the narrow band (± 2.25% fluctuation), except the LIT in the wide band 
 (± 6% fluctuation). 
24.09.1979  Realignment (DKR –3%, DM +2%) 
30.11.1979  Realignment (DKR –5%) 
23.03.1981  Realignment (LIT –6%) 
5.10.1981  Realignment (DM +5.5%, FF –3%, HFL +5.5%, LIT –3%) 
22.02.1982  Realignment (BFR –8.5%, DKR -3%) 
14.06.1982  Realignment (DM +4.25%, FF –5.75%, HFL +4.25%, LIT –2.75%) 
22.03.1983  Realignment (BFR +1.5%, DKR +2.5%, DM +5.5%, FF –2.5%, IRL –3.5%, 
 HFL +3.5%, LIT –2.5%) 
22.07.1985  Realignment (BFR +2%, DKR +2%, DM +2%, FF +2%, IRL +2%, HFL +2%, 
 LIT –6%) 
7.04.1986  Realignment (BFR +1%, DKR +1%, DM +3%, FF –3%, HFL +3%) 
4.08.1986  Realignment (IRL –8%) 
12.01.1987  Realignment (BFR +2%, DM +3%, HFL +3%) 
19.06.1989  The PTA joins the ERM with the wide band (± 6%) 
8.01.1990  The LIT joins the narrow band (± 2.25%). Realignment (LIT –3.6774%) 
6.04.1992  The ESC joins the ERM with the wide band (± 6%) 
14.09.1992  Realignment (BFR +3.5%, DKR +3.5%, DM +3.5%, ESC +3.5%, FF +3.5%, IRL +3.5%,  
HFL +3.5%, LIT –3.5%, PTA +3.5%) 
17.09.1992  The LIT suspend its participation in the ERM. Realignment (PTA –5%) 
23.11.1992  Realignment (ESC -6%, PTA –6%) 
1.02.1993  Realignment (IRL -10%) 
14.05.1993  Realignment (ESC –6.5%, PTA –8%) 
2.08.1993  The ERM fluctuation bands are widened to ± 15%, except for the DM and the HFL 
6.03.1995  Realignment (ESC –3.5%, PTA –7%) 
25.11.1996  The LIT re-joins the ERM with the new wide band (± 15%) 
16.03.1998  Realignment (IRL +3%).  
Note: BFR, DKR, DM, ESC, FF, HFL, IRL, LIT and PTA denote, respectively, the Belgian franc, the 
Danish krone, the Deustchemark, the Portuguese escudo, the French franc, the Dutch guilder, the Irish 
pound, the Italian lira and the Spanish peseta. 
 
As we have seen, duration analysis requires the definition of two key variables: 
one that accounts for the occurrence of the event under study (i.e. the indicator of the 
regime  changes)  and  other  which  measures  the  time  elapsed  between  consecutive 
changes (i.e. the duration of each regime). 
 
The indicator of the regime changes is constructed using a dummy, which takes 
the  value  one  whenever  a  regime  change  is  observed  and  zero  otherwise.  For  this 
purpose,  we  consider  that  a  currency  experience  a  regime  change  when  any  of  the 
following situations occur: (1) the currency joins the ERM; (2) a realignment of its  
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central parity is registered; (3) its fluctuation bands are modified
4. This determines the 
structure of our dataset, although two relevant features need carefully consideration. 
First, the way in which a change is defined imposes the right-truncation of the data, 
since the ERM ceased before the last change for each currency had been registered. On 
the other hand, recall that each currency may experience several regime changes along 
the  sample  period;  this  phenomenon  is  known  as  multiple  record  data  or  multiple 
failure-time data. These two questions are appropriately dealt with in all estimations in 
the paper
5. Finally, in order to avoid having too much zeros in the sample, we adopted 
the convention of keeping only observations where the currencies examined registered a 
regimen change. This convention is consistent with the systemic nature of the ERM, 
where  although  each  currency  had  a  central  rate  expressed  in  terms  of  ECU,  these 
central rates determined a grid of bilateral central rates vis-à-vis all other participating 
currencies,  and  defined  a  band  around  these  central  rates  within  the  exchange  rates 
could  fluctuate  freely.  More  over,  in  order  to  keep  these  bilateral  rates  within  the 
margins, the participating countries were obliged under the ERM to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market if a currency approached the limits of its band. Therefore, the 
responsibility  for  maintaining  each  bilateral  exchange  rate  within  its  margin  was 
explicitly shared by both countries.  
 
Concerning duration, we define this variable as the number of quarters elapsed 
between two consecutive changes. Change and duration define the survival-time data 
associated with each regime. Their summary statistics are presented in Table 2. As can 
be seen, for the eight currencies considered we have a total of 154 observations, with 
the average duration being 6.6 quarters. The average (empirical) probability of change is 
42%. 
 
                                                 
4 For the Italian lira (LIT), we also consider as a change its temporary exit of the system in the third 
quarter of 1992 and its re-entrance in the fourth quarter of 1996. 
5 All estimations were performed using STATA 8.1, which permits the appropriate treatment of both 
multiple-record and right censored data.  
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Table 2: Change and Duration. Descriptive statistics 
  ALL CURRENCIES 
  Change  Duration 
Mean  0.416  6.617 
Std. Dev.   0.494  5.976 
Skewness  0.34  1.004 
Min  0  1 
Max  1  21 
     





Figure 4 plots the duration of the ERM regimes for the entire sample period 
(1979-1998).  As  shown,  there  is  a  high  percentage  of  short  durations  (less  than  5 
quarters), representing the 52% of the total sample, while long durations (greater than 
15  quarters)  only  account  for  9%.  This  result  shows  that  the  regime  changes  are 
frequent in the sample; in particular the number of changes with duration less than 5 
quarters is 49. 
 



















4.2. Economic explanatory variables 
 
  Once the key variables in determining the structure of the survival-time data, 
have  been  properly  defined,  we  can  focus  on  the  description  of  the  economic  and 
political variables that will be considered in our empirical investigation.  
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  As we previously saw in equation (6), Krugman’s canonical model of exchange 
rate dynamics in a target zone states it depends both on exchange rate fundamentals and 
on its own expected rate of expected change.  
 
  Regarding  the  fundamental  variables,  inline  to  the  theoretical  framework 
presented  in  Section  2,  we  consider  the  following  variables  as  potential  economic 
factors influencing the probability of a regime change: 
  
1)  The money supply: An increase in the domestic money supply, which results in 
an initial excess money supply, immediately drives prices up, depreciating the 
exchange rate and increasing the probability of realignment. We use M3 data 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International 
Monetary Fund: line 39mcc.  
2)  The production level: One would expect that an increase in the level of output 
(included in our specification through the industrial production index), would 
signal stronger economic performance and then would reduce the pressure on 
the domestic currency, leading to a lower probability of a regime change. We 
use  data  on  the  index  of  industrial  production  from  the  Main  Economic 
Indicators (MEI) published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  
3)  The  real  exchange  rate:  An  increase  in  the  real  exchange  rate  (which  might 
indicate a loss external competitiveness), would result in a higher probability of 
a regime change. We compute this variable using data on exchange rates and 
consumer price indices from the Bank of Spain (for the Spanish peseta) and IFS 
(lines 64), respectively. 
4)  The interest rate in Germany: An increase in this variable would indicate greater 
risk  of  devaluation,  and  therefore  would  generate  expectations  of  future 
realignment, negatively affecting the duration of a given regime. In particular we 
use data on short-term interest rate (IFS, line 60c). 
5)  The price level in Germany: A higher price level in Germany would reduce the 
probability of devaluation through a reduction in inflation differentials with the 
anchor country. In particular we use data on consumer price index from the IFS 
(line 64). 
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  As for the expected rate of expected change in the exchange rate, we examine 
the role of the following variables in explaining the probability of a regime change:  
 
6)  A  credibility  measure:  One  would  expect  that  growing  credibility  would  be 
associated  with  significant  reductions  in  the  probability  of  a  regime  change. 
Following  Ledesma-Rodríguez  et  al.  (2005),  we  use  the  marginal  credibility 
indicator δt, defined as: 
 
st  - Et-1(st) = γ  + δt [ct - Et-1(st)] + ut 
 
Note that different value of δt are obtained for each time period in the sample. 
 
7)  The central parity deviation: The position of the exchange rate inside the band 
has been regarded as being an important variable in influencing the probability 
of a regime change [see, e. g., Thomas (1994), Chen and Giovannini (1994) and 
Mizrach  (1995)].  The  higher  the  deviation  from  the  central  parity,  the  more 
difficult  to  defend  it  and,  therefore,  the  higher  the  probability  of  a  regime 
change.  
 
4.3. Political explanatory variables 
 
  As far as political variables are concerned, the data come from The Comparative 
Political  Data  Set  1960-2001,  by  Armingeon  et  al.  (2002).  This  is  a  collection  of 
political and institutional statistics which covers a period of about 30 years and includes 
information  on  more  than  20  countries.  The  political  and  institutional  variables 
suggested by different Political Economy models, and whose effects in the functioning 
of the ERM we aim to investigate are: 
 
A.  Cabinet composition: The partisan theory suggests that ideological differences 
between  parties  must  be  reflected  in  their  attitudes  towards  the  economy. 
Therefore, it is assumed that left-wing parties care  about unemployment and 
growth, while right-wing ones are more concerned with inflation. However, it 
has  been  argued  that  left-wing  parties  could  use  of  the  exchange  rate  as  a 
nominal anchor for credibility-enhancing purposes, signalling the commitment  
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to  stable  policies  desired  by  the  market  participants.  In  order  to  explore  the 
evidence for the case of the exchange rate policy, we will consider a dummy 
variable (called dmleft) which will take the value one whenever left-wing parties 
have the hegemony in the cabinet and zero otherwise. If left-wing parties are 
effectively more prone to depreciate, as the Partisian Theory predicts, we will 
expect  a  positive  sign  on  the  associated  coefficient.  But  if  the  credibility-
enhancing  argument  is  correct,  we  will  expect  a  negative  sign  for  such 
coefficient. 
B.  Elections: Politicians care about holding office (Alesina et al. 1997). Therefore, 
in order to maximize their re-election chances they are expected to (artificially) 
stimulate  the  economy  in  the  run-up  to  an  election.  With  respect  to  the 
exchange-rate policy, two contrary arguments may be used to hypothesize the 
influence on an imminent election. On the one hand, governments may use the 
exchange-rate to signal the reliability of their macroeconomic policies (Giavazzi 
and Pagano, 1988); in this case, policymakers will tend to delay depreciation 
until  after  the  elections.  On  the  other,  it  is  the  so-called  “competitiveness” 
motive  for  depreciation;  in  countries  where  the  tradable  sector  performs  an 
outstanding  role,  a  depreciation  will  boost  the  economy  by  making  national 
goods more competitive both in world and home markets. In the case of the 
ERM, the aims that inspired the inception of the system and its own architecture 
make the competitiveness argument very unlikely. Under a pegged exchange 
rate, policymakers have limited ability to affect the real exchange rate at will
6. 
Moreover,  realignments  within  the  system  needed  the  approval  of  all  other 
participating currencies. Furthermore, both EMS and her centrepiece, the ERM, 
constituted  an  important  intermediary  step  to  European  Monetary  Union 
(Sosvilla-Rivero and Pérez-Bermejo, 2006), an  agreement to foster economic 
integration among European countries. Then, consistent with the “credibility-
damaging” argument, we expect depreciations to be postponed after elections 
because of their inherent political costs. To investigate this intuition we will 
include a dummy (el), taking the value one whenever an election occurred in the 
                                                 
6 Nonetheless, policies may have an impact in the real exchange rate. Froot and Rogoff (1991) find that 
among EMS countries, government spending tends to fall heavily on non-traded goods what will have 
increased  the  real  exchange  rate.  However,  as  Rogoff  (1992)  emphasizes,  any  such  effect  must  be 
transitory.  
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year  in  question
7.  If  our  ex-ante  hypothesis  were  true,  this  variable  should 
exhibit a negative sign. 
C.  Type  of  Government:  Single  party  governments  and  multi-party  temporarily 
coalitions are two extreme cases regarding government stability; between these 
two categories some intermediate figures, as minimal winning coalitions, surplus 
coalitions,  single  party  minority  governments  or  multi-party  minority 
governments  are  feasible.  The  soundness  of  the  macroeconomic  policies 
implemented is expected to increase with the stability of the government, and 
this will translate into less frequent realignments as far as exchange rates are 
concerned.  In  order  to  investigate  this  intuition in  the  case  of  the  ERM,  we 
incorporate  into  the  analysis  a  dummy  (dmtemporarily)  which  accounts  for 
unstable administrations (i.e. multi-party temporarily governments). If unstable 
governments effectively were associated with less consistent policies, the sign 
exhibited on this variable should be negative.  
D.  Central bank independence: Independent central banks are means of achieving 
credibility  in  policy  making,  thus  reducing  the  average  of  inflation  and  its 
variability (Alesina et al., 1997). As a low inflation facilitates the maintenance 
of a peg with a low-inflation anchor, like Germany in the case of the EMS, it 
may  be  expected  a  negative  relation  between  the  degree  of  central  bank 
independence and the probability of a devaluation taking place. The variable 
considered  here  is  an  index  created  by  Freitag  (1999)  that  compiles  the 
information  of  some  other  measures  [Alesina  (1988),  Cukierman  (1992), 
Eijffinger  and  Haan  (1996)  and  Grilli  et  al.  (1991)]  that  have  investigated 
different aspects of this “independence”. For example the index constructed by 
Alesina  (1988)  analyses  whether  the  central  bank  has  final  authority  over 
monetary policy, while the index by Cukierman (1992) is more focused on some 
legal  aspects.  Hence,  the  main  advantage  of  the  index  of  we  make  use  is 
precisely  that  summarizes  several  dimensions  of  “independence”  into  a  sole 
(continuous) variable. 
 
                                                 
7 We can adopt this definition because none of the eight countries under study experienced more than one 
electoral process in any particular year during the sample period considered.  
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5.- Empirical results 
 
5.1 A first look at the empirical hazard and survivor functions: The Non-Parametric 
approach 
   
As we discussed in the econometric section, a first way of analyzing the duration 
dependence of the data is to examine the empirical hazard and survivor functions. The 
Kaplan-Meier hazard estimate for the eight currencies under study is depicted in Figure 
5. The great heterogeneity registered in the evolution of the ERM makes the pattern of 
the empirical hazard far from being conclusive; up- and down-ward trends mix in a very 
irregular pattern reflecting not only differences in the conditions of the participating 
currencies but also some relevant changes in the functioning of the system itself. Only 
from the tenth quarter on we may infer negative duration dependence, though it should 
be noted that the accuracy of the estimator decreases as time passes since inferences 
about long durations are based on fewer observations.  
 














The Kaplan-Meier estimator for the survivor function is shown in Figure 6. As 
can be seen, the probability decreases sharply for durations less than 4 quarters; for 
intermediate  durations,  among  4  and  10  quarters,  the  fall  is  smoother  but  also 
noticeable. Finally, for durations longer than 10 quarters this probability remains almost 
stable up to reach the maximum (21 quarters). This behaviour suggests two different 
patterns in the evolution of the ERM: for those regimes with higher durations (more  
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than 10 quarters) the ERM would have been stable, while for the regimes associated 
with lower durations (less than 4 quarters) the ERM would have been more unstable. 
 












  As  a  conclusion,  the  empirical  approximation  to  the  analysis  of  duration 
highlights  the  enormous  variability  present  in  the  evolution  of  the  ERM;  striking 
differences  between  participating  currencies,  across  different  periods  and  in  the 
functioning of the system itself enhance the need for incorporating additional variables 
into the analysis. 
 
5.2. Evaluating the role of economic and political factors: The Parametric approach 
 
  Since one of the major contributions of this paper is the evaluation of some 
relevant political economy factors on the analysis of the ERM experience, and in the 
line with previous works [see, e. g., Bussière and Mulder (1999)], a useful starting point 
is to consider a benchmark model that provides a sufficiently clear picture of the role 
played by pure economic factors.  
 
Table 3 summarises the results for the benchmark specification that only takes 
into  account  economic  variables.  Before  turning  to  the  analysis  of  the  Political 
Economy  factors  and  given  that  this  model  will  be  used  as  the  starting  point,  it  is 
valuable to discuss their main predictions.  
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Table 3: Parametric estimation of the benchmark model (only economic variables) 
Variables  Expected sign  COX  WEIBULL  EXPONENTIAL 




















Interest rate in 
Germany 






Price Index in 
Germany 
























q q q q      1.43 
(3.33)** 
 
AIC    583.12  274.77  291.68 
Absolute z-statistic in parentheses 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering on currency 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
 
As this table shows, all the coefficients are significant at the usual level and 
show the expected sign. More in detail, our results suggest that the level of production 
and  prices  in  Germany  and  the  credibility  measure  have  a  negative  effect  on  the 
probability of a realignment occurring. On the contrary, the money supply, the  real 
exchange rate, the interest rate in Germany and the deviations around the central parity 
have positively affected the probability of change. 
 
These  results  are  in  line  with  Krugman’s  canonical  model  of  exchange  rate 
dynamics in a target zone. As this model suggests, the persistence of weak economic 
fundamentals over time – represented in our specification by a high supply of money, an 
overvalued real exchange rate and high inflation and interest differentials with respect to 
the anchor of the system – will inevitably result in a regime change. On the other hand, 
there is also a role to be played by market expectations; market feelings are underlay in 
some variables – picked by a noticeable deviation from the central parity and a low 
credibility –that put additional pressures on the currency and may cause its realignment.  
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As a conclusion, these results demonstrate that the sustainability of a given exchange 
rate regime in the ERM was influenced by both fundamental variables and some proxies 
of the animal spirits Furthermore, this evidence is indicative that the implementation of 
sound  economic  policies  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient  perquisite  to  prevent  a 
devaluation; policymakers must also strength their reputational capital to convince the 
markets. 
 
After discussing our benchmark model, we now turn to the incorporation of the 
political  and  institutional  factors  previously  commented.  Table  4  summarizes  the 
estimation results of the model combines both economic and political variables. As can 
be seen, all the coefficients included are significant at the usual level and most of them 
show the expected sign. It is interesting to note that the coefficients and significance for 
the  economic  variables  of  our  benchmark  model  remain  largely  stable,  providing 
additional robustness to that model. Furthermore, all of the parameters in Table 3 are 
within the 95% confidence interval that we have estimated in Table 4. This result can be 
interpreted  as  suggesting  that,  even  though  the  policy  variables  do  influence  the 
probability  of  realignment  inside  the  ERM,  there  is  no  significant  change  in  the 
influence of the economic variables on this probability. 
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Table 4: Parametric estimation of the extended model  
(both economic and political variables) 
Variables  Expected sign  COX  WEIBULL  EXPONENTIAL 




















Interest rate in 
Germany 






Price Index in 
Germany 




















































q q q q      1.59 
(7.84)** 
 
AIC    414.94  179.11  202.20 
Absolute z-statistic in parentheses 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering on currency 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
 
 
Given the noisy picture exhibited by the  empirical hazard (see  Figure  5), an 
interesting hypothesis to test for the presence of duration dependence, once we control 
(part of) the heterogeneity present in the data, is to conduct a test regarding the ancillary 
parameter  in  the  Weibull  model.  Recall  from  equation  (22)  that  if  q   were  greater 
(lower) than one, the duration dependence would be positive (negative) while if it were 
equal to unity the Weibull distribution would collapse to the Exponential, suggesting no 
duration dependence. As it is shown in Table 4, the point estimate of the parameter is 
1.59, suggesting positive duration dependence; additionally, the test for the null  1 q =  is  
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rejected  at  the  1%  level.  We  may  conclude  that,  conditional  on  the  economic  and 
political factors included, the data exhibit positive duration dependence, indicating that 
(other things equal) the probability of a regime change increases over time. This result 
strengthens the use of duration models. 
 
Concerning the interpretation of the political variables investigated, the results 
indicate  that  in  the  ERM  experience  left-wing  governments,  electoral  years  and 
independent central banks would have negatively affected the probability of a regime 
change,  while  less  stable  governments  would  have  been  more  prone  to  realign  the 
central parities. These relations largely agree with the main implications of the Political 
Economy models previously commented. Only the negative sign associated with the 
dummy representing left-wing governments would contradict the standard prediction of 
the Partisan theory. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the importance of the use of the 
exchange rate by left-wing governments as a nominal anchor for credibility-enhancing 
purposes. Moreover, this positive association between left-wing government and regime 
stability would be in line with the changes registered in the political agendas all over 
Europe as results of the EMU. For example, Mélitz (1995, p.26) argued that “[T]he 
French behaviour can be best explained on the basis of long-run political goals. By 
maintaining the policy of the franc fort, the French authorities wished to promote the 
aim of Monetary Union”. In the same line, Drazen and Masson (1994) showed how “la 
politique de rigueur” implemented by Mitterand’s first socialist government, enhanced 
the  credibility  for  a  “hard  currency  peg”  policy,  even  at  a  cost  of  a  higher 
unemployment.  The  commitment  to  a  strong  franc  convinced  investors  that  the 
priorities of the authorities had changed, what was reflected in shorten of (long-term) 
interest rate differentials with Germany. Finally, this finding is also consistent with the 
results in Frieden (2002), whose analysis of the EMS shows how left-wing governments 
were associated with less volatile currencies, as well as with those in Leblang (2002), 
who argues that left governments are more likely to use all policy tools at their disposal 
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5.3 Assessing the goodness of fit 
   
After carrying out the estimation, a first question to ask is which of the three 
parametric models (i.e., Cox, Weibull and Exponential) is the best in terms of goodness 
of it. To discriminate among them we have employed two different criteria widely used 
in the duration analysis literature: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Cox-
Snell residuals. 
 
The  AIC  is  particularly  suitable  for  comparing  models  that  are  not  nested. 
Akaike  (1974)  proposed  penalizing  each  log  likelihood  to  reflect  the  number  of 
parameters being estimated in a particular model and then comparing them, choosing 
the one with the lowest AIC statistic. In our case, as Table 4 shows, the Weibull model 
exhibits the lower AIC and then, according to this criterion, should be the preferred. 
 
A second way to assess the goodness of fit of the three parametric models is to 
look at their Cox-Snell residuals (Cox and Snell, 1968). These residuals are defined as 
follows: 
( ) ˆ log e S t x = -  
 
where S(t/x) is the estimated probability of surviving to time t. Then, if the model fits 
the data, these residuals should have a standard censored exponential distribution with 
hazard ratio equal to one (Cox, 1972). We can verify this intuition simply by plotting an 
empirical estimate of the cumulative hazard, taking the Cox-Snell residuals as the time 
variable, versus these residuals themselves. This plot should be a straight line with slope 
equal to one. As Figure 7 clearly shows, the Weibull model is the one with the lowest 
departures form the 45º reference line, indicating also the best fit in terms of this second 
criterion. 
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  As a conclusion, the two criteria presented here yield conclusive evidence in 
favour of the Weibull model as that exhibiting the superior fit.  
 
  Perhaps a more interesting question is to compare the political augmented model 
with our benchmark both in terms of explanatory power and goodness of fit. Recall that 
both the AIC  and the  Cox-Snell residuals are still two valid criteria to perform the 
comparison.  First,  in  terms  of  explanatory  power,  the  AIC  statistic  for  the  political 
model is lower than that for the reference one (i.e. 179.11 versus 274.77), indicating an 
improvement in the explanatory power of the original model. Moreover, note that for 
the  other  two  specifications  (i.e.  Cox  and  Exponential)  the  AIC  for  the  augmented 
model is always lower than the benchmark, suggesting that the addition of the political 
variables helps to improve explanatory power. 
 
  Regarding the goodness of fit, Figure 8 depicts the Cox-Snell residuals for both 
the political augmented and the benchmark specifications. As can be seen, the residuals 
for the first model show fewer departures from the reference line than the benchmark
8. 
Hence,  according  to  this  figure,  we  could  assert  that  the  fit  of  the  political  model 
outperforms that of the reference specification. 
 






0 1 2 3 4
Extended Benchmark
Cox-Snell residuals; Extended vs Benchmark models
 
 
                                                 
8 For the economy of space we have omitted the figures for the Cox and Exponential models (these 
graphs are available upon request). Again, in these two cases the political augmented model exhibits a 
superior fit.  
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5.4 Sensibility analysis 
 
  In order to check the robustness of our results, a distinction is made between two 
groups  of  currencies.  A  first  group  of  currencies  (that  we  shall  denote  as  “core”) 
includes  FF,  BFR,  HFL  and  DKR,  while  a  second  group  (that  we  shall  denote  as 
“periphery”) is formed by IRL, LIT, PTA and ESC. It is interesting to note that these 
two groups roughly correspond to the distinction made by the European Commission 
(1995) between those countries whose currencies continuously participated in the ERM 
from its inception maintaining broadly stable bilateral exchange rates among themselves 
over the sample period, and those countries whose currencies either entered the ERM 
later or suspended its participation in the ERM, as well as fluctuating in value to a great 
extent relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups are also roughly the same found 
in Jacquemin and Sapir (1996), applying multivariate analysis techniques (i.e., principal 
components  and  cluster  analysis)  to  a  wide  set  of  structural  and  macroeconomic 
indicators, to form an homogeneous group of countries.  
 
  As can be seen in Table 5, when estimating the extending model separately for 
both groups of countries all the coefficients are significant at the usual level and show 
the expected sign.  Moreover, with the only exceptions are the interest rate in Germany 
for the core group and the central parity deviation for the periphery group, the estimated 
coefficients remain within the 95% confidence interval of those of the whole sample, 
therefore suggesting that there is no evidence of heterogeneity associated to currencies 
with different behaviour in the sample. 
 
This result strongly suggests that the ERM would have effectively acted as a true 
system, where common interests would have had priority over the individual ones, and 
only real differences (at least as perceived by market participants) could have explained 
the different evolution of the participant currencies.  
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Table 5: Sensibility analysis for the extended model  
(both economic and political variables) 
Variables  Whole sample  Core   Periphery 


























































































AIC  179.11  192.97  194.37 
Estimation results for the Weibull models 
Absolute z-statistic in parentheses 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering on currency 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
In italics, estimated parameters that exceed the 95% confidence interval of those 
of the whole sample 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has attempted to expand the scarce research available on the role of 
political  variables  in  explaining  regime  changes  in  international  arrangements  under 
which  national  monetary  authorities  attempt  to  keep  their  exchange  rates  within 
currency bands as the ERM. Our definition of regimen changes includes entries into the 
system and changes in the fluctuation bands. These changes do not necessarily imply an 
exchange rate crisis. Thus the issue of the paper is the broader one of changes in the 
official rules of membership in a fixed exchange rate agreement (which could reflect 
strictly political reasons or a possible desire to avert crises that are not yet imminent). 
 
Indeed,  since  market  participants  incorporate  information  from  a  variety  of 
sources into their expectations, we think that political variables may play a significant 
role in explaining such regime changes (which could reflect strictly political reasons or 
a possible desire to avert realignments or crisis that are not yet imminent). Therefore, 
we have explicitly incorporated political and institutional factors into the explanation of 
exchange  rate  policies,  in  contrast  to  almost  all  existing  analyses  that  have  focused 
entirely on economic factors. In addition, a second major contribution of this paper is 
the application of duration analysis, which we think to be appropriate in dealing with 
exchange rate regimes. 
 
Our  results  indicate  that  both  economic  and  political  factors  are  important 
determinants of European currency policy. Considering just pure economic factors, we 
have used the target zone models as a theoretical framework to identify the potential 
determinants variables affecting regime duration. In particular, we find that the money 
supply, the real exchange rate, the interest in Germany and the central parity deviation 
would have negatively affected the duration of a given regime, while credibility and the 
price  level  in  Germany  would  have  positively  influenced  this  duration.  Regarding 
political  factors,  elections,  central  bank  independence  and  left-wing  government 
increase  the  probability  of  maintaining  the  current  regime,  while  less  stable 
governments would be associated with a regime change.  These results are robust to the 
distinction of core and periphery countries. 
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The study provides several implications for macroeconomic policy. It reveals 
that the sustainability of a given regime in the ERM discipline was affected both by 
fundamental  variables  and  by  investor’s  expectations  about  government  behaviour. 
Such a result might indicate that to prevent regime changes in a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement such as the ERM it is not sufficient to pursue sound economic policies, but 
policymakers must enhance their reputational capital with respect to their commitment 
to maintain the exchange rate around the central parity. 
 
The findings also shed  light on the role of policy  variables during the  EMS 
history  through  the  expectations  generated  by  the  market.  Our  results  suggest  that 
unstable governments associated with less consistent policies would have been more 
prone to devaluate. In addition, we find a negative relation between the degree of central 
bank independence and the probability of a devaluation taking place, indicating that an 
independent  central bank would have been  able to stabilise the exchange rate more 
freely  than  a  dependent  one.  Moreover,  consistently  with  the  opportunistic  models, 
electoral  years  would  have  negatively  affected  the  probability  of  a  regime  change, 
suggesting that realignments would have been postponed after elections because of their 
inherent political costs. Finally, in contrast to partisan models, left-wing governments 
would have positively influenced the duration of a given central parity. Nevertheless, 
this result may be consistent with the importance of the use of the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor for credibility-enhancing purposes. Since left-wing governments had 
questionable credibility so far as price stability is concerned, they will be more likely to 
use all policy tools at their disposal to stabilise the economy, and therefore realignments 
would have been less likely when this government are in power. 
 
Finally, we have shown how the political augmented model outperforms, both in 
terms  of  explanatory  power  and  goodness  of  fit,  our  benchmark  (economic)  model, 
supporting  the  implications  of  previous  papers  (Mélitz,  1999;  Bussière  and  Mulder, 
1999) which emphasized the improvement in the results when political and institutional 
variables were incorporated into the analysis of currency crises. 
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Fig 1a: BFR/DM exchange rate       Fig 1b: DRK/DM exchange rate  
(including ERM intervention limits)     (including ERM intervention limits) 
             











Fig 1c: ESC/DM exchange rate       Fig 1d: FF/DM exchange rate  
(including ERM intervention limits)     (including ERM intervention limits) 












Fig 1e: HFL/DM exchange rate       Fig 1f: IRL/DM exchange rate  
(including ERM intervention limits)     (including ERM intervention limits) 











Fig 1g: ITL/DM exchange rate       Fig 1h: PTA/DM exchange rate  
(including ERM intervention limits)     (including ERM 
intervention limits) 
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